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Abstract 
Americans face the challenges of retirement with varying degrees of preparation. Evidence 
indicates that that many individuals may not be making the best possible choices with respect to 
their Social Security and retirement savings. We assess the subjective expectations of non-
retirees and find that they have sizable biases and uncertainty about future retirement benefits. 
This uncertainty and the level of subjective expectations can affect workers’ wealth 
accumulation and retirement readiness. We build on these observations and combine unique 
survey data with a life-cycle optimization model to measure the role of Social Security literacy, 
subjective expectations about retirement benefits, and behavioral traits as determinants of life-
cycle savings decisions and welfare. The goal of this project is to better understand the role of 
retirement expectations as determinants of savings decisions and retirement income. We 
forecast future benefits and measure the bias in expectations. We find heterogeneity in the 
direction of the expectation bias: Men and those with low levels of uncertainty about retirement 
benefits are less likely to overestimate their future retirement benefits, hence are more likely to 
save more and reach retirement better prepared. We find that these biases in subjective 
expectations translate into suboptimal asset accumulation and welfare losses. 
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1. Introduction 
The period after retirement typically poses economic risks and challenges that 
differ from those faced during working life. Americans reach retirement with varying 
degrees of preparation and, thus, government-provided social insurance plays an 
important role, especially when private pensions and personal savings fall short. 
However, research shows that retirement security is a major concern for many 
Americans: In 2014, the Employee Benefit Research Institute’s Retirement Confidence 
Survey reported that only 18% of workers were confident about having enough money 
for a comfortable retirement while 36% of respondents reported total savings or 
investments under $1,000. 
Poterba (2014) points out the large differences in retirement finances between 
the upper and lower strata of the income distribution. There is a steep gradient in the 
portfolio composition of individuals’ assets at retirement age. In the data from the 
Current Population Survey, only 5.4% of the individuals 65 and older in the lowest 
quartile of income distribution receive pension income, and 26.4% of them received 
asset income in 2013. These numbers are 52% and 57% respectively for individuals 65 
and older in the third quartile of the income distribution. According to these data, Social 
Security benefits make up 85% of individual income for those at the bottom quartile of 
the distribution. 
A key pillar of retirement security in the United States is the Social Security 
system and, therefore, understanding Social Security benefits is a key component of 
optimal financial planning. Yet there is wide-spread confusion about claiming ages, how 
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benefits are calculated, and entitlements, and many nonretirees are not confident about 
receiving the level of Social Security benefits they currently are entitled to when they 
retire (Yoong et al. 2015). This lack of knowledge or biased subjective expectations 
could lead to suboptimal savings and retirement choices. Moreover, behavioral traits 
(such as an overall propensity to plan, or lack thereof) and their interaction with the 
choice environment can affect planning, potentially exacerbating differences in the 
ability to correctly make decisions involving the complex rules behind Social Security 
benefit determination (Binswanger and Carman 2012). 
This paper highlights the characteristics and relevance of expectations about 
Social Security retirement benefits and the importance of behavioral aspects of planning 
for retirement. For this, we developed a survey to measure expectations and their 
influence on retirement and retirement preparation. We use the biases measured from 
the survey to study the role of expectations about retirement as a determinant of 
savings decisions and retirement income. We contrast the ex-post experience of current 
retirees to the expectations of nonretirees. We find that there is sizable uncertainty 
about future retirement benefits among nonretirees. This uncertainty and the level of 
subjective expectations are correlated with the accumulation of wealth by workers, 
which is in line with the presence of precautionary savings. We find some heterogeneity 
in the direction of the expectation bias: Older workers and men are less likely to 
overestimate their future retirement benefits. But we find no significant difference by 
educational attainment on the probability of overestimating benefits. 
Lusardi et al. (2017) find that endogenous financial knowledge accumulation has 
the potential to account for a large proportion of wealth inequality. This happens as high 
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earners find it optimal to accumulate more financial knowledge than low earners, and 
this boosts their wealth accumulation even further. Scholz et al. (2006) assess the 
optimality of wealth accumulation using a stochastic life-cycle model with rational 
expectations about future earnings and benefits using HRS data from 1992. They find 
that most people in 2005 had achieved their savings targets according to their model. 
We build on the aforementioned observations to develop a quantitative analysis 
that combines the unique survey data we collected with a standard life-cycle 
optimization model to measure the role of Social Security literacy and subjective 
expectations about retirement benefits as determinants of life-cycle consumption and 
savings decisions. We use our survey data to inform a standard life-cycle optimization 
model augmented with subjective expectations to predict individual savings and 
consumption paths. We compare such predictions with those that would result from the 
often-made assumption of perfect information or rational expectations. We compare the 
welfare resulting from different savings paths, and assess the relative importance of 
subjective expectations and behavioral factors in determining savings dynamics and 
welfare.  
Related papers in the literature are Scholz et al. (2006) for the case of rational 
expectations and Benítez-Silva et al. (2009) for subjective expectations. A separate 
literature has focused on other determinants of savings, like medical expenditures and 
bequest motives,1 but we abstract from those dimensions. The main features of our 
model are standard in this literature, such as allowing for uninsurable risky earnings. 
                                               
1 See Laitner and Juster (1996), De Nardi et al. (2010), Lockwood (2018) and De Nardi and 
Yang (2014). 
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Our contribution is to include a set of individual subjective expectations, which allows us 
to measure the importance of expectations biases. This approach allows us to measure 
the welfare consequences of biased beliefs and behavioral factors, as well as the 
insurance effects of Social Security benefits. Furthermore, we compare the 
respondents’ actual wealth positions and earnings paths to those generated by the 
perfect information model and by the model that includes elicited subjective 
expectations. 
Section 2 explains our data and the methodology we follow to elicit subjective 
expectations in our survey. Section 3 shows the empirical findings. Section 4 introduces 
the model and presents the results from our quantitative analysis. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Data 
2.1 The Understanding America Study 
Our main data source for all the economic, demographic, and subjective 
expectations variables is the Understanding America Study (UAS). The UAS is an 
internet panel study, managed by the University of Southern California, of currently 
more than 8,000 households representing the entire U.S.2   
The UAS consists of module surveys that can be linked to each other. It collects 
a wide range of variables, including household demographics, knowledge and attitudes 
                                               
2 The panel was recruited by address-based sampling, and anyone willing to participate yet 
lacking a computer or internet access has been provided a tablet and broadband Internet. 
Sampling weights for the UAS are generated in such a way that the weighted distributions of 
specific sociodemographic variables in the survey sample match their population counterparts 
as derived from the Current Population Survey. 
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of retirement planning, understanding of Social Security, financial literacy, numeracy, 
cognition, and personality traits. The module on asset and income data in the UAS is 
modeled after the Health and Retirement Study, and respondents complete it biennially. 
Two key advantages of the UAS are the ability to leverage available past surveys and 
the ability to introduce new surveys that take advantage of the online mode.  
We supplemented our expectations survey with other data collected in the UAS, 
including household demographics, attitudes and perceptions of retirement planning in 
general, understanding of Social Security eligibility and entitlements, and qualitative 
views on expectations of Social Security, assets, and income. 
2.2.1 Sample 
For our analysis, we consider nondisabled workers and retirees.3 This leaves us 
with a sample of 4,632 nondisabled adults 20 and older. The sample means are shown 
in Table 1. 
Table 2 shows the number of nondisabled individuals 20 and older in each age 
and group-education category cell in the survey. For most of our analysis, we focus on 
individuals 30 or older who are neither disabled nor retired. This reduces the sample to 
3,099 respondents. Of those, we have information on Social Security benefit 
expectations for 2,162 respondents, and the earnings history for 1,337 of them.  
  
                                               
3 The survey (UAS72: https://uasdata.usc.edu/index.php) was in the field between January 9 
and November 3, 2017. During this period, 5479 UAS panel members were invited to take the 
survey, of whom 5,109 respondents completed the survey, for a response rate of 93.2%. 
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Table 1: Survey sample means 
Characteristic Mean 
Male 42.9% 
Less than high 
school 4.9% 





Average age 48.8 
Married 62.5% 
Retired 19.5% 
Source: UAS 72 









20-29 51 343 156 550 
30-39 62 512 420 994 
40-49 37 478 374 889 
50-59 32 588 318 938 
60-69 26 459 323 808 
70-79 17 197 150 364 
80+ 5 45 39 89 
Total 230 2,622 1,780 4,632 
Source: UAS 72 
2.1.2 Standard variables in UAS 
We supplemented our survey with data from other UAS modules. The UAS 
collects income data from all sources and several categories of assets every two years, 
using the same survey instrument as the Health and Retirement Study. So far, these 
surveys collected data for 2015 and 2017. Therefore, two waves of income and assets 
data are available for most respondents. 
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2.1.2.1 Income and wealth measures 
In retirement, households have three main sources of income: Social Security 
benefits, their own (private) savings, and employer-provided pensions. To study the 
degree of retirement readiness in our sample, we need accurate measures of these 
components. The UAS fields two modules designed after the Health and Retirement 
Study assets and income modules, which collect comprehensive and detailed data on 
income and wealth components.  
Net worth (private savings) is a comprehensive measure that includes housing 
assets less liabilities, business assets less liabilities, checking and saving accounts, 
stocks, bonds, mutual funds, retirement accounts including defined-contribution 
pensions, certificates of deposit, the cash value of whole life insurance, and other 
assets, less credit card debt and other liabilities. It excludes defined-benefit pension 
wealth, Social Security wealth, and future earnings. The concept of wealth is similar 
(and in many cases identical) to those used in other studies of wealth and saving 
adequacy.4  
We include labor earnings from employment, including self-employment, in our 
analysis. We deflate nominal past reported income to year 2010 dollars using the 
Consumer Price Index. 
2.1.2.2 Financial literacy 
For financial literacy, we use the five questions about basic financial concepts 
questions developed by Lusardi and Mitchell (2007) to compute a financial literacy 
                                               
4 In our analysis, we winsorize the wealth variables using a 99% cut. 
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score. The financial literacy score is the number of correct answers, thus it takes values 
between zero and five. The basic financial literacy questions included in UAS are the 
following: 
1. Numeracy 
Suppose you had $100 in a savings account and the interest rate was 2% per 
year. After 5 years, how much do you think you would have in the account if you 
left the money to grow? (i) More than $102; (ii) Exactly $102; (iii) Less than $102; 
(iv) Do not know (DK); (v) Refuse. 
2. Compound Interest 
Suppose you had $100 in a savings account and the interest rate is 20% per 
year and you never withdraw money or interest payments. After 5 years, how 
much would you have on this account in total? (i) More than $200; (ii) Exactly 
$200; (iii) Less than $200; (iv) DK; (v) Refuse. 
3. Inflation 
Imagine that the interest rate on your savings account was 1% per year and 
inflation was 2% per year. After 1 year, how much would you be able to buy with 
the money in this account? (i) More than today; (ii) Exactly the same; (iii) Less 
than today; (iv) DK; (v) Refuse. 
4. Time Value of Money 
Assume a friend inherits $10,000 today and his sibling inherits $10,000 3 years 
from now. Who is richer because of the inheritance? (i) My friend; (ii) His sibling; 
(iii) They are equally rich; (iv) DK; (v) Refuse. 
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5. Money Illusion 
Suppose that in the year 2010, your income has doubled and prices of all goods 
have doubled too. In 2010, how much will you be able to buy with your income? 
(i) More than today; (ii) The same; (iii) Less than today; (iv) DK; (v) Refuse. 
2.1.2.3 Other variables 
Other variables collected include the age at which the respondents expect to 
claim Social Security benefits, and whether they expect that the Social Security system 
will be able to pay their promised benefits in the future. 
2.1.3 Specific variables from the custom UAS survey 
The UAS survey module we designed for this project elicits subjective 
distributions of future labor earnings, Social Security retirement benefits, defined benefit 
plan amounts, balances in other retirement plans, and retirement age. It also includes 
the following key aspects: planning strategies (rule of thumb, planners, unsystematic), 
earnings history, and retirement experience versus preretirement expectations (for 
retirees only). 
2.1.3.1 Elicitation of subjective expectations 
For the survey respondents who are not retired, we elicit their subjective 
expectations about several variables of interest: Social Security retirement benefits, 
defined benefit retirement plans, future earnings, other assets (including balances in 
defined contribution retirement accounts), medical expenditures in old age, and age at 
retirement. For all the monetary variables we elicit a distribution of expected values, in a 
fashion similar to Dominitz and Manski (2006). 
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We elicit subjective expectations about Social Security retirement benefits 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 in 
the following way: We ask about the highest monthly benefit the individual might receive 
�𝑌𝑌ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ�, and about the lowest monthly benefit the individual might receive  (𝑌𝑌𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙). Then, 
we divide this support into five equal intervals and ask respondents the chances that 
their benefits will fall within each of the five intervals. In this way we obtain the 
subjective distribution 𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = Pr(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 < 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖|Ω𝑖𝑖) for individual 𝑖𝑖 with information set Ω𝑖𝑖, where 
 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝑛𝑛 =  1 … 5 are the thresholds based on 𝑌𝑌ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ and  𝑌𝑌𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙. 
We implemented this elicitation using the visual format in Delavande and 
Rohwedder (2008). The visual format elicits information on individuals’ subjective 
probability distributions about their future variables of interest in a way that mimics the 
density function of their subjective beliefs. An example of the screen seen by the 
respondent is given in Figure 1. Participants are asked to place balls in each bin, 
proportional to the chances of each possible outcome. In a preliminary experiment, we 
compared different elicitation methods and found this one to be the most reliable.5  
In all questions that refer to the future value of some variable, we ask participants 
to think about it in real terms: “as if a dollar in the future were worth the same as a dollar 
today.” When the question is about the monetary value of something in the past, like 
earnings history, we ask about it in nominal terms. 
  
                                               
5 In Prados and Kapteyn (2016), we validated this method against alternatives and found that 
this visual format was slightly faster and not as prone to errors among the less educated. 
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Figure 1: Visual elicitation of subjective distribution  
for future Social Security benefits 
 
Note: This figure shows an example of the screen a survey participant sees. In this case, the 
minimum retirement benefit the participant expects to obtain is $1,000, and the maximum is 
$3,300. The participant has placed 16 balls in bins according to his subjective probabilities of 
retirement benefits ending up in each of the intervals, and still has four balls to allocate. The 
participant cannot move on to the next question before allocating all 20 balls. 
To elicit expectations about future earnings, for most participants, we divided the 
future horizon between the time of the survey and their expected retirement in two 
periods. We asked them to provide the maximum and minimum expected earnings for 
each period. We divided that support in five bins and asked them to assign a probability 
to each bin. For participants who expected to retire within the next five years, we only 
asked about one future period between the survey date and retirement. We asked them 
to report their expected future earnings in current dollars, not accounting for future 
inflation. 
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2.1.3.2 Earnings history 
To elicit past earnings, we divided the working history of each individual in a 
number of time periods. Depending on how long the respondents have been 
participating in the labor force, they were asked about their average past earnings over 
their work history divided in one, two, or three periods. They were asked about their 
past earnings in nominal terms, as is standard practice. 
2.1.3.3 Planning Types 
We use the answers to four questions to categorize individuals to three types 
according to their attitudes toward planning, following Binswanger and Carman (2012). 
The planning types are: 
• Unsystematic: if subject reports no planning and no rule of thumb for savings; 
• Planner: if subject has a forward-looking plan for savings; 
• Rule of thumb: if subject follows a simple rule of thumb to determine their 
savings. 
2.2 Auxiliary data 
We use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to estimate a model of 
earnings and forecast future earnings paths for our UAS sample. We use the Consumer 
Price Index series from the Bureau of Labor and Statistics to deflate nominal earnings. 
3. Empirical Evidence 
3.1 Measures of expectations and retirement adequacy, current retirees 
Part of the motivation for this study comes from evidence indicating that current 
retirees are not satisfied about aspects of their retirement. We survey current retirees in 
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our sample about their present retirement experience. We analyze the kind of regrets 
they experience after retirement. Table 3 shows there is sizable heterogeneity in the 
degree of retirement readiness current retirees felt at the time of their retirement. 
Table 3: Financial readiness for retirement, current retirees 
How well prepared financially were you for 
retirement? 
Percent 
Very well prepared 28.2% 
Somewhat well prepared 42% 
Not too prepared 18.3% 
Not prepared at all 11.5% 
Note: The number of observations for this variable is 950. Source: UAS 
Of the retiree subsample in the survey, 43% said they would want to be able to 
change something about their current retirement. Individuals with high school are more 
likely to want to change how retirement is going than college graduates, as shown in 
Figure 2. 
Figure 2: Fraction of respondents in the retiree subsample who say they would 
want something different about their retirement 
 
Note: Proportion by educational attainment. 95% confidence intervals shown. 
Source: UAS 
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When looking at the aspects they would like to be able to change, 22% of current 
retirees in our sample regret claiming Social Security benefits when they did (20% of 
retirees would have liked to claim later). Figure 3 shows several aspects of retirement 
that current retirees would have liked to change. The main aspects have to do with 
income during retirement, being better prepared, and retiring later. Thirty-seven percent 
of the respondents in this subsample would have liked to retire later, but only half of 
those who would have liked to retire later would have also preferred to claim their 
benefits later.  
Figure 3: What would people like to change about their own retirement? 
 
Note: Proportion of retirees who would change each retirement aspect. 
Source: UAS, retiree subsample 
Some retirees acknowledge they had biased expectations — before retiring — 
about the retirement benefits they would receive. In fact, 21.4% of the respondents said 
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the benefits they received at retirement were substantially different than what they 
expected to receive. As Figure 4 shows, most of them had expected to receive more. 
Figure 4: Distribution of expectation error (monthly amount), among  
current retirees 
 
Note: The ex-post error is defined as the actual monthly amount of Social Security retirement 
benefits received when they started claiming minus the benefit they had expected to receive. 
Therefore, negative values indicate the benefits received were lower than expected. 
Source: UAS, retiree subsample 
The size of these errors varies with the educational attainment of retirees, as 
Figure 5 shows. Those with lower educational attainment are more likely to be receiving 
benefits substantially lower than what they expected. High school and college degree 
holders seem to be mostly receiving what they were expecting. 
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Figure 5: Difference between expected and received SS benefits 
(as percent of received) 
 
Source: UAS, retiree subsample 
3.2 Factors that may affect retirement readiness 
Social Security benefits are an important component of financial resources during 
retirement and a major source of income for many individuals. Yet, many individuals 
display high levels of uncertainty about their future retirement benefits, which may affect 
their retirement readiness. More than 50% of our sample of nonretirees declare they do 
not have a good estimate of their future Social Security benefits. Additionally, at least 
12% of those who expect to retire by age 65 assign a positive probability to receiving 
benefits (in real terms) above the current legal maximum. 
We asked nonretired participants how well they would say they know the value of 
their future retirement benefits. They had the following options: i. “I know for certain how 
much they will be” (9% of respondents); ii. “I have a guess/estimate” (41.9%); iii. “I have 
no idea how much they will be” (49.1%). Figure 6 shows the fraction in each category 
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across age groups. The perceived uncertainty about future retirement benefits 
decreases with age. 
Figure 6: Knowledge about future Social Security retirement benefits  
(self-reported) 
 
Note: Percent of each age group according to what they know about 
their future Social Security benefits. Source: UAS 
There is heterogeneity in behavioral factors that may be relevant to retirement 
readiness, such as propensity to plan and financial literacy. Figure 7 shows the 
prevalence of different attitudes toward financial planning, as defined in Section 2.1.3.3. 
Most individuals fall within the categories of unsystematic savings or they follow a rule 
of thumb to determine their savings. Around 30% of the sample report having 
determined their needs and planned accordingly. Older and more educated individuals 
are more likely to be systematic planners. The left panel of Figure 7 shows that older 
individuals are more likely to be systematic planners and less likely to have an 
unsystematic approach to their financial planning than younger individuals. The right 
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panel of Figure 7 shows that most individuals with high school degree or less are not 
systematic about their financial planning, but the unsystematic planners are the minority 
among individuals with a college degree. Individuals with a college degree are more 
likely to be either planners or to follow a rule of thumb than individuals with lower 
educational attainment. 
Figure 7: Prevalence of planning for retirement by age (left) and educational 
attainment (right), nonretirees 
 
Source: UAS 
Figure 8 presents the average financial literacy score, defined in Section 2.1.2.2. 
A similar pattern as seen for financial planning applies when it comes to financial 
literacy. Older individuals and those with higher levels of educational attainment fare 
better when it comes to understanding basic financial literacy concepts than younger or 
less educated ones. 
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Figure 8: Average financial literacy score by age (left) and educational attainment 
(right), nonretirees 
Note: The minimum financial literacy score is 0 and the maximum is 5. 
Source: UAS 
3.2.1 Subjective expectations 
Using the elicited subjective distribution of monthly amounts of future Social 
Security benefits, we compute distributional moments, measures of uncertainty, 
expectation bias, and the probability of overestimating future benefits.  For this, unless 
the individual probability distribution function elicited is constant for each bin or 
degenerate at one value, we assume subjective expectations follow a lognormal 
distribution at the individual level.6 Like Dominitz and Manski (1997), we use a least-
squares criterion to fit person-specific lognormal distributions to the answers of the 
respondents. For each individual distribution, we obtain the mean and standard 
deviation, and compute the inter-quartile ratio (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 =  𝑝𝑝75 − 𝑝𝑝25).  
6  Of the nonretired sample ages 30 to 70, 4.5% provided a constant probability for each bin of 
their benefits expectations, while 3.5% of this sample gave a degenerate distribution for their 
expected monthly benefits. 
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Table 4 shows the average mean and IQR of the distributions of expected 
monthly Social Security benefits by characteristics of nonretirees. The means of the 
distributions of benefits follow an expected pattern as higher income individuals 
(college, married, men) expect higher levels of benefits. 
Table 4: Average mean and IQR of subjective Social Security benefit 
distributions, by characteristics of the subsample of nonretirees 
 Mean IQR 
Total sample 1470.40 207.27 
Female 1312.05 191.43 
Male 1662.35 225.88 
Not married 1397.63 203.51 
Married 1507.12 209.16 
Less than high 
school 1017.86 250.26 
High school 1301.81 184.34 
College 1697.86 231.61 
Note: The IQR is the difference between the percentiles 75 and 25 of the distribution. 
We use the IQR as an approximate measure of an individual’s level of 
uncertainty about their future retirement benefits. Figure 9 shows that this uncertainty 
declines with age. There is substantial variation in the IQR of the subjective distributions 
of retirement benefits, with many individuals displaying high levels of uncertainty about 
their future benefits.  
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Figure 9: Average inter-quartile range (IQR=p75-p25 of monthly benefits 




3.3 Determinants of subjective expectations 
To find the variables associated with these expectations, we use ordinary least 
squares to regress the mean of expectations about future retirement benefits on a set of 
demographic, socioeconomic, and knowledge-related explanatory variables. We restrict 
the sample to nonretirees ages 30 to 70. The results are presented in Table 5. Column 
(1) includes basic demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, including earnings 
(the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation7). Column (2) looks at the effect of financial 
literacy. To differentiate between uncertainty or lack of knowledge and bias in 
expectations, Column (3) includes categories of self-reported knowledge about future 
retirement benefits. 
                                               
7 For earnings and assets, we use the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation (ihs) throughout 
our analysis. This transformation approximates the natural logarithm and allows retaining zero‐
valued or negative observations. (MacKinnon and Magee 1990) 
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We find that the expectations relate strongly and positively to income, as 
expected. The level of expected benefits is also positively correlated with education, 
age, and being male. A higher degree of financial literacy is associated with higher 
expectations about future benefits. Individuals who declare not knowing what their 
benefits will be report a significantly lower level of expected benefits. 
Table 5: Determinants of expectations about Social Security benefits 
 
Expected Social Security Benefits 
 Baseline Including fin. lit. 
Including SS 
knowledge 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Age expected to claim benef. -2.47 -2.46 -2.61 
  (2.05) (2.04) (2.38) 
High school, GED, AD 156.81 137.43 18.09 
  (95.47) (95.72) (114.84) 
College 522.58*** 482.12*** 308.75*** 
  (96.43) (97.82) (118.17) 
Male  285.58*** 277.75*** 253.37*** 
  (31.54) (31.68) (38.99) 
Age 11.68*** 11.39*** 6.65*** 
  (1.63) (1.63) (2.16) 
Earnings (ihs) 35.10*** 34.19*** 26.23*** 
 (3.89) (3.90) (4.70) 
Financial literacy  30.94** 22.38 
   (13.01) (16.84) 
Have a guess about benefits   -52.54 
    (81.98) 
Have no idea about benefits   -342.73*** 
    (84.69) 
Constant 324.03* 259.52 918.35*** 
  (184.23) (186.03) (250.74) 
Observations 2,198 2,198 1,378 
R-squared 0.17 0.17 0.18 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The omitted category for 
knowledge about retirement benefits is “I know for certain how much they will be.” Source: 
UAS, nonretirees subsample, ages 30 to 70 
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We next consider the variables associated with different levels of uncertainty 
about future Social Security benefits. To account for the relative importance of the 
dispersion in expectations with respect to the size of the benefits, we divide the IQR by 
the mean of the subjective distribution of benefits and consider this as a measure of 
uncertainty faced by the survey respondents. Table 6 presents the results from 
regressing this measure of uncertainty on demographic, socioeconomic, and 
knowledge-related variables.  
As in Table 5, the baseline specification in Column (1) includes basic 
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, Column (2) looks at the effect of 
financial literacy, and, Column (3) includes knowledge about future retirement benefits.  
In this case, there are not many variables significantly associated with the level of 
uncertainty. Higher earners and older workers report lower levels of uncertainty. 
Interestingly, uncertainty is not related to the age at which a respondent is expected to 
claim benefits. As expected, people who declare not knowing what their benefits will be 
show significantly higher levels of dispersion in their expectations about future benefits. 
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Table 6: Regression results for uncertainty about future retirement benefits 
  Uncertainty 
 




 (1) (2) (3) 
Age expected to claim 
benef. 
-0.042 -0.042 -0.027 
  (0.043) (0.043) (0.053) 
High school, GED, AD -3.287 -3.329 -4.025 
  (2.026) (2.034) (2.552) 
College -2.677 -2.765 -3.856 
  (2.047) (2.079) (2.626) 
Male  -0.257 -0.274 0.016 
  (0.669) (0.673) (0.866) 
Age -0.317*** -0.317*** -0.200*** 
  (0.035) (0.035) (0.048) 
Earnings (ihs) -0.673*** -0.675*** -0.547*** 
 
(0.082) (0.083) (0.105) 
Financial literacy  0.067 0.239 
   (0.276) (0.374) 
Have a guess about 
benefits 
  2.778 
    (1.822) 
Have no idea about 
benefits 
  8.090*** 
    (1.882) 
Constant 43.124*** 42.984*** 30.431*** 
  (3.910) (3.953) (5.572) 
Observations 2,198 2,198 1,378 
R-squared 0.073 0.073 0.089 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Uncertainty is defined 
here as IQR/E(benefits)*100. We scale it as percentage points to facilitate the interpretation of 
effect sizes. Source: UAS, nonretirees subsample, ages 30 to 70 
Figure 10 shows how this uncertainty varies by age group and according to 
knowledge about future benefits. Uncertainty decreases with age and correlates with 
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the respondents’ own assessment of their knowledge about their future Social Security 
benefits. 
Figure 10: Uncertainty as function of age and knowledge about  
Social Security benefits 
 
Note: Uncertainty = IQR/E(benefits). Source: UAS, nonretiree subsample 
3.4 Bias in Social Security benefits expectations  
We compute expectation bias about future Social Security benefits. For this, we 
compare the respondents’ expected levels of benefits to our own forecasts. To forecast 
their future benefits, we apply Social Security Administration’s algorithm to  the earnings 
histories elicited from the respondents. We define: 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝑏𝑏 = 𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌) − 𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓𝐸𝐸𝑓𝑓𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑏𝑏𝐸𝐸. 
The Social Security Administration computes retirement benefits, YSS, as a 
function of the individual i’s entire labor earnings (z) trajectory, since he or she started 
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working at age j1 until he or she claims retirement benefits at age R;8 the individual’s 
birth cohort (yearbirth) and age of benefit claiming:  
𝑌𝑌𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = 𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 ��𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖�𝑗𝑗1
𝑅𝑅
,𝐼𝐼,𝑦𝑦𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏ℎ�. 
In order to forecast the future Social Security retirement benefits of the 
respondents in our sample, we construct their earnings trajectories using the 
information provided in the survey to obtain: 











3.4.1 Earnings history 
To construct the earnings history needed for the forecast of retirement benefits, 
survey respondents were asked about their past labor earnings. For this, we divided the 
time since the year when they started working to the time of the survey in three periods 
and asked them about their average labor earnings in each of those three periods. The 
survey included questions about labor earnings while working and about intervals of 
nonemployment. Within each period, we transform this step function of past earnings 
provided by the survey into an age profile of earnings. For this, we use coefficients for 
the age profile of earnings that vary by gender and education, as estimated from the 
PSID by Abbott et al. (2018). The details are in Appendix A.1. This generates a 
sequence of past earnings corresponding to �𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖�𝑗𝑗1
𝑗𝑗∗
. 
                                               
8 Under certain circumstances, it is possible to grow retirement benefits after claiming for a 
person who continues working (for example, if the person claimed benefits before full 
retirement age). Because we only ask about expected benefits at the moment of claiming, we 
abstract from this possibility in our analysis. 
27 
3.4.2 Forecasts of future earnings 
We use two sources of earnings forecasts for the period after the UAS survey 
until the expected benefits claiming age. The first source is the subjective distribution of 
future earnings we elicit from the survey respondents. The means of the each period’s 
distributions provide a step function of expected future earnings. We transform this step 
function into a yearly sequence of earnings analogously to the transformation used to 
build the annual earnings history. 
The second source is our own forecast for future labor earnings, �?̂?𝑧𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖�𝑗𝑗∗
𝑅𝑅 . We 
assume real labor earnings for individual 𝑖𝑖 at time t follow this specification: 
log 𝑧𝑧𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 + log 𝑧𝑧𝑏𝑏−1𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑏𝑏 + 𝜖𝜖𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 ,    
where the vector of individual characteristics 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 includes gender, an age polynomial of 
second order, education, marital status, race, and lagged employment. The 
specification includes time dummies, δt. 𝜖𝜖𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 is assumed to be independent and identically 
distributed with a normal distribution. 
We estimate this specification using an auxiliary sample from the PSID. The 
sample consists of those 30 and older, nondisabled, nonretired, and in the labor force. 
We use the PSID survey waves 1990 to 2015. We then forecast the earnings of the 
UAS respondents using the estimated coefficients from the auxiliary sample. Appendix 
A.2 presents additional details about this process. 
When comparing the forecasted earnings using this method to the earnings 
expected by the respondents, we find that people expect to earn more than what these 
forecasts indicate. Appendix A.2 presents the distribution of this expectation bias with 
details by subgroups. 
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3.4.3 Forecast of future Social Security retirement benefits  
For each nonretired respondent in our sample, we forecast future Social Security 
retirement benefits using information on annual earnings history, age at which the 
respondent plans to start collecting Social Security benefits, birth year, and forecasts of 
future earnings. We do this following the rules on benefit determination from the Social 
Security Administration, as outlined in Appendix A.3. 
We use two specifications to forecast retirement benefits. Our preferred 
specification takes as input the future earnings forecasted from the PSID, we denote it 
as YforecPSID. The alternative specification takes as input the earnings predicted by the 
survey respondents, and we denote it as Yforecsubj. 
3.4.4 Expectation bias in retirement benefits 
We measure expectation bias as the difference between the forecasted future 
benefits and the subjective mean of the expected benefits. Table 7 shows the average 
values for expectation bias (computed using YforecPSID) for population subgroups in our 
sample. We note that the bias is positive for all groups: On average, each group 
appears more optimistic about future benefits than implied by the PSID-based forecast. 
The highest bias corresponds to those with a college degree. The average bias, $307, 
equals 27% of the average forecasted benefit for this sample. 
Potential sources of expectations bias in retirement benefits may be biased 
expectations about future earnings or lack of knowledge about Social Security benefits 
rules. One important rule corresponds to benefit adjustments according to whether the 
individual claims early or delays claiming. We look at how biased expectations about 
future earnings and lack of adjustment for claiming age may affect expectation biases. 
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Table 7: Expectation bias about retirement benefits by subpopulation 
 Expectation bias (=Esubj(Y) - YforecPSID) 
95% Confidence 
interval 
Sample average 307.0 [270.5,343.5] 
Female 326.3 [279.9,372.8] 
Male 282.1 [223.9,340.4] 
Less than high 
school 79.6 
[-63.1,222.4] 
High school 262.8 [220.3,305.4] 
College 371.4 [308.0,434.7] 
Not married 325.3 [263.5,387.0] 
Married 297.9 [252.7,343.1] 
Note: Bias is defined as the difference between expected monthly Social Security retirement 
benefits and benefits forecasted using SSA formulas and earnings forecasts computed from 
PSID estimation. 
Figure 11 shows the histograms of benefit expectations bias by gender. It 
compares the distribution of bias using PSID-forecasted earnings versus using the 
subjective expectation of future labor earnings. The bias using PSID-forecasted 
earnings indicates that both genders have a tendency to overestimate their future 
retirement benefits. Using the future labor earnings expected by the survey respondents 
would make the bias seem smaller for both genders, as the distributions shift to the left. 
Both genders are too optimistic about their future earnings, and this is reflected in their 
expectations about retirement benefits. 
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Figure 11: Retirement benefits expectation bias, by gender and source  
of earnings forecast 
 
Note: YforecPSID takes as input the future earnings forecasted from the PSID. Yforecsubj uses the 
respondents’ expected future earnings as input. 
Figure 12 presents histograms of benefit expectations bias by educational 
attainment. We explore the role of knowledge about the consequences of early and 
delayed claiming as potential factors behind benefits expectations. The figure compares 
the distribution of retirement benefits expectation bias (claim-age adjusted, using the 
self-reported expected claiming age) versus a version of bias where the benefit forecast 
is the value at full-retirement age, without accounting for early or delayed claiming (not 
claim-age adjusted).  
Not appropriately adjusting for early or delayed claiming in general reduces the 
dispersion in biases. In particular, it affects those with lower educational levels the most. 
For those with less than a high school degree, not appropriately adjusting for early or 
delayed claiming leads to higher levels of expected benefits, shifting the unadjusted 
bias distribution to the left. For high school graduates, adjusting for the timing of benefit 
claiming is less consequential than for the less educated, but it still decreases the 
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expected benefits and increases the dispersion in bias. The distribution of bias for 
college degree holders is less affected by this adjustment. 
Figure 12: Retirement benefits expectation bias, by educational attainment 
 
Note: Claim-age adjusted corresponds to the bias computed using benefits forecast YforecPSID. 
Not claim-age adjusted is the bias computed using benefits forecast not adjusted for early or 
delayed claiming. 
To get a sense of what variables are associated with biased expectations, we 
regress the expectation bias (Esub[Y]-YforecPSID) on explanatory variables. Table 8 
presents the results. The basic specification in Column (1) only includes demographics. 
Column (2) also includes a set of variables based on subjective expectations, which 
include the age at which the individual expects to start claiming retirement benefits, a 
measure of dispersion of subjective expectations about future retirement benefits — the 
IQR of the distribution and the bias in earnings expectations. Columns (3) to (5) 
gradually add other factors that may affect the precision of retirement benefits 
expectations: financial literacy, attitudes about planning for retirement (planner, rule of 
thumb, or unsystematic), knowledge about what future benefits will be, and confidence 
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that Social Security programs will exist in the future. Because the question about 
confidence in future availability of Social Security programs was collected in a previous 
UAS module than the rest of the variables in this survey, the sample size declines when 
the regression includes this variable. 
The results in Table 8 support the view that retirement benefits expectation bias 
is a function of expected earnings, expected claiming age, and understanding of Social 
Security rules. Retirement benefits expectation biases are negatively associated with 
the expected benefit claiming age, which could indicate that individuals are not 
adequately accounting for early claiming penalties or for the benefits of delayed 
claiming. Having more uncertainty about future retirement benefits, as captured by the 
IQR of the subjective distribution, is positively associated with a higher expectation bias. 
The bias in expected earnings is positively associated with the bias in expected benefits 
in most specifications, except in the specification in column (3) where the interaction 
with financial attitudes renders the coefficient on expected earnings bias insignificant.  
Most specifications indicate that men have lower expectation bias than women 
and that age is positively associated with retirement benefits expectation bias. The role 
of educational attainment is not clear, as those with college have higher biases, but 
once we control for other factors, the size of the coefficient of the college dummy 
decreases and becomes insignificant. Financial literacy is weakly associated with higher 
expectation bias. Those who “have no idea what [their] benefits will be” show much 




Table 8: Regression models for expectation bias of Social Security benefits 
 Expectation bias (=Esub[Y]-YforecPSID) 
 Basic + expect. + fin. fact. + SS know + SS conf. 
 Regressor (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
High school, 
GED, AD   
183.18 66.33 -66.97 55.33 -558.82 
(120.95) (155.09) (180.39) (168.03) (352.78) 
College  291.52** 202.91 95.16 210.91 -506.30 
(121.29) (155.49) (184.11) (169.35) (353.07) 
Male -44.20 -170.13*** -191.47*** -157.38*** -270.18*** 
(37.52) (41.47) (56.71) (46.96) (78.30) 
Age -0.58 12.24*** 8.65*** 5.51* 18.26*** 
(2.17) (2.51) (3.34) (2.95) (5.05) 
Claiming 
expected age  
-69.03*** -59.15*** -58.98*** -82.51*** 
 (6.92) (8.51) (7.55) (14.83) IQR subj. exp. 
 1.27*** 1.30*** 1.23*** 1.41*** 
 (0.10) (0.13) (0.12) (0.19) 
Earnings exp. 
bias  
7.45*** 2.77 5.75** 8.25** 
 (2.06) (2.77) (2.32) (3.94) 
Financial 
literacy   
46.23*   
  (23.87)   Financial 
attitude: 
Planner 
  47.91   




  98.42*   
  (58.17)   
Have a guess 
about benefits    
-82.47  
   (114.84)  
Have no idea 
about benefits    
-345.66***  
   (117.17)  Confident 
SSA will pay     
103.68 
    (92.63) 
Constant 124.57 4,117.53*** 3,570.46*** 4,030.67*** 5,287.33*** 
(149.20) (488.27) (597.43) (546.58) (1,062.14) 
Observations 1,899 1,049 503 710 314 
R-squared 0.01 0.23 0.28 0.26 0.27 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The omitted category for 
attitudes with regards to planning for retirement is “unsystematic.” The omitted category for 
knowledge about future Social Security benefits is “I know for certain how much they will be.”  
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We conduct an alternative analysis focusing on the sign of the expectation bias. 
For this, we define an indicator for whether individuals overestimate or underestimate 
the amount of retirement benefits they will receive from Social Security. On average, 
individuals in our sample tend to overestimate the level of retirement benefits they will 
receive from Social Security. We fit a probit model to predict the likelihood of 
overestimating future benefits. Table 9 presents the estimated marginal effects from 
these regressions. The specification in Column (1) includes demographics and years to 
benefit claiming. Column (2) also includes the dispersion of subjective expectations 
about future retirement benefits measured by the IQR. Column (3) adds labor earnings. 
Columns (4) and (5) include other factors that may affect the expectations about 
retirement benefits: financial literacy, attitudes about planning for retirement (planner, 
rule of thumb, or unsystematic), and knowledge about what future benefits will be. 
The results show that individuals closer to their intended benefit claiming age and 
older individuals are less likely to overestimate their future benefits. As in the 
regressions for the level of expectation bias, educational attainment does not appear to 
have a significant effect on the probability of overestimation. Having a college degree is 
not associated with a higher probability of overestimating benefits. Individuals with 
higher earnings are more likely to overestimate their future retirement benefits from 
Social Security.9 Men are less likely than women to overestimate their benefits, but the 
effect becomes insignificant once we control for financial literacy and attitudes.  
                                               
9 Unlike in the case of gender, earnings remain significant after controlling for financial literacy 
and planning attitudes in additional regression results (not reported in Table 9). 
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Table 9: Average marginal effect estimates of the probability of overestimating 
future Social Security retirement benefits 
 Probability of overestimating future benefits - Pr(Esubj[Y] > YforecPSID) 







 Regressor (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Years to benefits -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) High school, GED, AD 0.05 0.03 -0.00 0.03 0.01 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) College 0.09 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.02 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) Male -0.03 -0.05** -0.06*** -0.03 -0.03 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) Age -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.05*** -0.05*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) Age2 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) IQR subj.expec.  0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Earnings (ihs)   0.01***   
   (0.00)   
Financial literacy    0.00 -0.00 
    (0.01) (0.01) Planner    0.05 0.03 
    (0.05) (0.05) Rule of thumb    0.05 0.01 
    (0.03) (0.03) Have a guess about 
benefits     -0.07 
     (0.08) Have no idea about 
benefits     -0.22*** 
     (0.08) 
Observations 1,899 1,899 1,892 1,048 1,048 
Pseudo R2 0.063 0.098 0.110 0.091 0.113 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: The units of the IQR in this regression are hundreds of dollars. The omitted category for 
attitudes with regards to planning for retirement is “unsystematic.” The omitted category for 
knowledge about future Social Security benefits is “I know for certain how much they will be”; 
(ihs) indicates inverse hyperbolic sine transformation. 
36 
Similarly to the regressions for the level of expectation bias, a higher dispersion 
in benefit expectations is associated with an increased probability of overestimating 
future benefits. Financial literacy and attitudes toward financial planning are not 
significant. Interestingly, those who claim to have no knowledge of their future benefits 
are more likely to err on the conservative side and underestimate their future benefits. 
3.5 Patterns of asset accumulation 
We look at the main factors correlated with the total net wealth amount 
accumulated by the nonretired individuals in our sample. The literature has devoted 
much attention to measuring and describing the relationship between financial literacy, 
numeracy, and financial decisions (e.g. Banks et al. 2010; Ameriks et al. 2003; Lusardi 
and Mitchell 2007; Lusardi et al. 2017). Therefore, we incorporate these aspects in our 
analysis. We estimate the following regression: 
𝑊𝑊𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑊𝑊𝐸𝐸ℎ = 𝛽𝛽0 ∗ 𝑋𝑋 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∗ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝐸𝐸𝑏𝑏 + 𝛽𝛽2 ∗ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝�������⃗ + 𝛽𝛽3 ∗ 𝑈𝑈𝑛𝑛𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑓𝑓𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝐸𝐸𝑦𝑦 + 𝛽𝛽4 ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸 +
𝛽𝛽5 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑊𝑊𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛 + 𝜖𝜖,  
where 𝑋𝑋 is a vector of demographic characteristics (gender, age, race/ethnicity, marital 
status, educational attainment); 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝�������⃗  is a vector that includes expected retirement age, 
expectations about future Social Security retirement benefits, and future earnings 
expectations; 𝑃𝑃𝑊𝑊𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛 is the attitude about planning type (planner, rule of thumb, 
unsystematic); and 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸 is the financial literacy score. 
Table 10 shows the regression estimates. All specifications include demographic 
characteristics. The models in Columns (1) to (3) include different subsets of 
expectations and uncertainty. Column (4) includes the bias in retirement benefits 
expectations. 
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Table 10: Regression models of total net wealth 







Regressor (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
Income, hh (ihs) 0.07 0.11 0.08 0.07 
 
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) 
Years to exp. 
retirement -0.03** -0.04*** -0.03** -0.04** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Exp. avg. future 
earnings  0.37 0.57** 0.23 0.47 
 
(0.28) (0.27) (0.32) (0.33) 
Expected SS ret 















 Financial literacy 
  
0.42** 0.46** 
   
(0.20) (0.21) 
Rule of thumb 
  
-0.99 -1.03 









   
0.00 
    
(0.00) 
Constant -16.33*** -11.21* -11.03 -3.66 
 
(6.22) (6.05) (7.04) (8.00) 
Other controls Y Y Y Y 
Observations 1,241 1,205 991 932 
R-squared 0.14 0.13 0.16 0.14 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Other controls include a 
second-degree polynomial in age and indicators of race/ethnicity, gender, educational 
attainment, and marital status. (ihs) indicates inverse hyperbolic sine transformation; (log) 
indicates natural logarithm transformation. 
The estimates in Table 10 indicate that total net worth is higher for those closer 
to retirement, as predicted by the life-cycle model. Uncertainty about retirement 
benefits, measured as IQR of benefits expectations, is positively associated with net 
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worth accumulation, but the effect disappears when we control for financial literacy and 
propensity to plan. The expectation about future benefits is positively associated with 
asset levels. However, this does not hold for the case of net financial assets.10 This may 
indicate that optimism about future benefits translates to investments in illiquid assets 
such as housing, while it does not affect financial wealth. Biased retirement benefits 
expectations are not associated with wealth levels. 
4. Model and numerical results 
To identify the effects of subjective expectations on household behavior and 
asset accumulation, we use a life-cycle model of savings. We assume the following 
household optimization problem: Every period, households choose how much to 
consume and save to maximize the present discounted value of expected lifetime utility, 
subject to risky labor earnings. When they retire, they receive retirement benefits, which 
are a function of their realized labor earnings. Households hold expectations regarding 
future labor earnings, retirement age,11 and retirement benefits.  
Households derive utility from consumption and their utility function is time 
separable. We assume the labor earnings process to be exogenous. Thus individuals 
do not choose how much to work and all fluctuations in earnings arise from the 
exogenous earnings process. Taxes (OASDI) are a function of household income, and 
Social Security retirement benefits are a function of lifetime earnings. 
                                               
10 We do not report these regression results. They are available upon request. 
11 For the sake of simplicity, we assume retirement and benefit claiming age are the same. 
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The dynamic optimization problem that a household 𝑖𝑖 solves at age 𝑆𝑆 can be 





{𝑆𝑆�𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖� + 𝛽𝛽𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉𝑗𝑗+1𝑖𝑖 �𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 ,𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖;Θ𝑗𝑗+1𝑖𝑖 �}          (4) 
subject to: 
𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 + 𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 + 𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗+1𝑖𝑖 = (1 + 𝑓𝑓)𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 + 𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖(1 − 𝜏𝜏) 






𝑖𝑖 + 𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 , if 𝑆𝑆 < 𝐼𝐼
𝑓𝑓𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 + 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆�� 𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖
𝑅𝑅
𝑗𝑗=𝑗𝑗0
� , if 𝑆𝑆 ≥ 𝐼𝐼
  
   
𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗+1𝑖𝑖 ~𝐹𝐹�𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆� 
𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 ≥ 0 
𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗+1𝑖𝑖 ≥ 𝑛𝑛𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑓𝑓𝐸𝐸𝑊𝑊 𝑏𝑏𝐸𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝐸𝐸𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝐸𝐸 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸. 






Θ𝑖𝑖 = {𝐹𝐹(. ),𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆(. )} is the information set of household 𝑖𝑖, which includes the 
process for labor earnings and the knowledge of the rules to determine Social Security 
retirement benefits. 𝐼𝐼 is the retirement age, 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 is consumption, 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 is assets, 𝛽𝛽 is the 
discount factor, r is the annual interest rate, 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖 is labor earnings, 𝜏𝜏(. ) is the income tax 
function, and 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆(. ) are Social Security benefits as function of lifetime earnings. For 
simplicity, the model assumes that the retirement age coincides with the retirement 
benefits claiming age. 
Each household’s information set includes their expectations about future labor 
earnings and retirement benefits. We assume no updating of the information set during 
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the lifetime of the household. In the subjective expectations specification, the household 
information set need not match the actual functional form of Social Security benefits or 
the statistical process of labor earnings. Instead, we use the subjective expectations 
data from our survey to approximate the subjective information set.  
We use the survey data to estimate the model and compute the optimal savings 
path under different scenarios, depending on the information set that households use: 
We assess the importance of subjective expectations for household wealth dynamics 
and welfare by comparing the savings and welfare predicted by the subjective 
expectations model to those predicted by the rational expectations model, where the 
information set includes objectively forecasted future earnings and the formula for 
Social Security retirement benefits dependent on realized earnings. 
4.1 Calibration  
For the rational expectations specification, we estimate the statistical process for 
future earnings from our sample’s full forecasted earnings. We assume the true labor 
earnings process is a persistent process, following a simple standard specification, 
given by:  
log 𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 + 𝜌𝜌 log 𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗−1𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 
𝜖𝜖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖~𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎), 
where 𝛼𝛼 is an idiosyncratic fixed effect, 𝜌𝜌 is the persistence of the process, and 𝜖𝜖 is the 
transitory component, which follows a normal distribution with standard deviation 𝜎𝜎. This 
specification is a good statistical approximation of the earnings process. 
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For the subjective expectations about labor earnings, we estimate a similar 
statistical process using the future earnings process corresponding to our survey 
respondents’ expectations. 
We start the life-cycle simulation at age 30. We assume individuals retire when 
they turn 67 — the current full retirement age for individuals born after 1960 — and they 
live until age 85 with certainty. Appendix A.4 includes additional details of the 
parameterization of the model. 
4.2 Simulations 
We compare the rational expectations outcomes to those that would occur if the 
individuals use their subjective expectations about income and retirement benefits. For 
that, we decompose the subjective information set to analyze the consequences of 
different aspects of it.  
4.2.1 Subjective expectations about retirement benefits 
We solve the optimization problem of individuals using the expected distribution 
of future retirement benefits from the UAS survey data. On average, individuals 
overestimate their future retirement benefits and are uncertain about their amounts, as 
seen in Section 3.4.4. We simulate 200 paths for the labor earnings process. We then 
calculate the resulting consumption, assets, and utility levels derived from using the 
policy functions for consumption and assets under subjective expectations, using as 
input the simulated earnings and retirement benefits paths from the objective forecasts.  
The results for the average consumption and assets paths under this scenario 
are shown in Figure 13. They are compared with the optimal paths under the rational 
expectations scenario. Panel (a) shows the average path for consumption. The path 
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derived using subjective expectations, results in too much consumption during the 
working years and too little consumption in retirement, compared to the rational 
expectations path. Panel (b) shows the average pattern of asset accumulation over the 
life cycle for these simulations. Individuals accumulate fewer assets while working when 
they follow their subjective expectations than in the rational expectations scenario. As a 
result of these discrepancies between the rational expectations paths and the paths 
under subjective expectations, the present discounted value of lifetime utility in the 
rational expectations model is 1% higher than the present discounted value of lifetime 
utility resulting from the subjective expectations about retirement benefits. 
Figure 13: Consumption and asset accumulation paths under rational 
expectations versus subjective expectations
 
(a) Consumption paths (b) Assets paths 
4.2.2 Decomposition of subjective expectations about retirement benefits 
The subjective expectations about retirement differ with respect to their mean 
forecast and also the degree of uncertainty. We decompose the effect along these two 
dimensions. We first look at the effects on the individual optimization problem of 
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expecting retirement benefits that are too high for their earnings history. For this, we 
solve individuals’ optimization problems with the average level of retirement benefits 
expectation bias, taken from the survey data. We assume the labor earnings process 
corresponds to the rational expectations case and there is no added uncertainty about 
retirement benefit amounts. The resulting consumption and savings paths are the “bias” 
results. 
Next, we compute the optimal consumption and savings policies derived when 
there is uncertainty about the future benefit level but the average corresponds to the 
objective forecast. We solve the individual optimization problem under the scenario of 
added retirement benefits uncertainty and simulate the outcomes for 200 realizations of 
the earnings path. The consumption and savings paths are the “uncertainty” results.  
The results for the average consumption and assets paths under these scenarios 
are shown in Figure 14. Panel (a) shows the average paths for consumption, and panel 
(b) shows the average patterns of asset accumulation over the life cycle for these 
simulations. The behavior based on biased benefits expectations results in too much 
consumption during the working years and too little consumption in retirement when 
compared to the rational expectations outcome. In this case, individuals accumulate 
fewer assets while working than in the rational expectations scenario because they 
overestimate the level of benefits they’ll receive during retirement. This means a welfare 
loss of 0.54%. When there is high uncertainty, there is less consumption during the 
working years and more consumption during retirement. This precautionary savings 
behavior is reflected in the pattern of assets accumulation. The welfare loss in this case 
is 0.74%. 
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Figure 14: Consumption and asset accumulation paths under rational 
expectations versus subjective expectations and uncertainty 
 
(a) Consumption paths (b) Assets paths 
4.2.3 Subjective expectations about future labor earnings and retirement benefits 
Lastly, we consider the implications of behaving according to the full set of 
subjective expectations, including expectations about labor earnings as well as about 
retirement benefits. We perform the same exercise as before: We derive the policies for 
savings and consumption using the subjective expectations for earnings and benefits 
distributions. We then simulate earnings paths from the forecasted distribution and use 
those policies to compute consumption and asset accumulation patterns. The average 
paths resulting from these simulations are shown in Figure 15. In this case, the 
discrepancy between the subjective expectations life-cycle patterns and the rational 
expectations ones results in lower asset accumulation and a welfare loss of 3.5%. 
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Figure 15: Consumption and asset accumulation paths under rational 
expectations versus subjective expectations  
 
(a) Average consumption paths (b) Average assets paths 
 
Conclusions 
Our results indicate that there is sizable uncertainty about future retirement 
benefits among nonretirees. We estimate that this uncertainty affects wealth 
accumulation by workers, as a result of precautionary savings. Our results on retirees 
corroborate that expectations about retirement are often biased, as retired individuals 
reported that on average they had been too optimistic about their retirement benefits. 
The relevance of these biased expectations is that they can lead, on average, to lower 
savings for retirement than would be optimal. Moreover, our results indicate that this 
affects the experience of retirement. 
A large fraction of retirees express regrets about choices they made about 
retirement. This has important policy implications. If individuals could reduce their 
uncertainty about future retirement, they would probably have fewer regrets after 
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retirement. In survey data from current workers, we find significant biases in retirement 
benefits expectations. Possible reasons for biased expectations and excess uncertainty 
about future benefits include overly optimistic predictions of future labor earnings and 
failure to properly adjust for early or delayed benefit claiming. Failure to properly adjust 
for early claiming would affect the less educated relatively more. 
These biases in retirement benefits expectations are higher among women, 
those who expect to claim earlier, and those with a high level of uncertainty about their 
future retirement benefits. As individuals get closer to their claiming age, they are less 
likely to overestimate their benefits. We find no difference in the probability of 
overestimating future retirement benefits by educational levels, but there are gender 
differences, with men being less likely to overestimate their future benefits. The 
importance of overestimating retirement benefits is that it may affect saving behavior 
and retirement preparedness. 
To measure the extent of these effects, we simulate a life-cycle model calibrated 
to match our survey data. Our simulation results indicate welfare losses from lack of 
accurate knowledge about the amounts of Social Security retirement benefits to be 
expected. This results in inadequate levels of asset accumulation before retirement. We 
find that this leads to a 1% loss in welfare when compared to the behavior based on 
rational expectations, considering earnings uncertainty and the appropriate Social 
Security rules governing the determination of retirement benefits.  
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Appendix 
A.1 Earnings history 
The UAS asks about past earnings in a succinct way. Depending on how long 
the respondents have been participating in the labor force, they were asked about their 
average past earnings over their work history divided in one, two, or three periods. This 
produces a short sequence of average past earnings over N periods, �𝑌𝑌��
𝑁𝑁
.12 Where, 𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖  
is the average nominal earnings reported for period 𝑛𝑛, corresponding to 𝑋𝑋 years. 
Therefore, if Yt and yt are nominal and real earnings in year t, respectively, the relation 










                                                           (a. 1) 
Approximating yt with a quadratic function of age, (a.1) results in: 
�
exp{𝛽𝛽𝐸𝐸𝑏𝑏 + 𝛼𝛼1 ∗ 𝑆𝑆 + 𝛼𝛼2 ∗ 𝑆𝑆2} ∗ 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑏𝑏
𝑋𝑋
𝑏𝑏=𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛…𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛+𝑋𝑋








where x is a vector of individual characteristics and j is age. 
Therefore, the annual values of past earnings are given by: 
                                               
12 For notational simplicity, we ignore the superscript corresponding to individual i. 
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𝑌𝑌𝑏𝑏 = exp{𝛽𝛽𝐸𝐸𝑏𝑏} ∗ exp{𝛼𝛼1 ∗ 𝑆𝑆 + 𝛼𝛼2 ∗ 𝑆𝑆2 } ∗ 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑏𝑏 = 𝑋𝑋
𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖
𝑘𝑘𝐽𝐽𝑋𝑋
∗ exp{𝛼𝛼1 ∗ 𝑆𝑆 + 𝛼𝛼2 ∗ 𝑆𝑆2} ∗ 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑏𝑏                     
We use this formula to fit an age profile to the earnings history data in the survey 
using the estimates by Abbott et al. (2018). Figure A.1 presents an example of what that 
results in for a representative respondent. 
Figure A.1: Earnings history for a survey respondent, survey raw data versus 
fitted to an age profile 
 
 
A.2 Earnings forecasts 
The auxiliary sample used to estimate the earnings process consists of PSID 
respondents 30 and older, corresponding to waves 1990 to 2015. Earnings from labor 
were deflated using the consumer price index, CPI-U, from the Bureau of Labor and 
Statistics. 
We use this sample to estimate the following earnings process for the logarithm 
of real labor earnings: 
log𝑦𝑦𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽 + 𝑋𝑋�𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏 + 𝛿𝛿𝑏𝑏 + 𝜀𝜀𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖, 
 Raw    −•−  Fitted to age profile 
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where X is a vector that includes a quadratic polynomial on age, marital status, gender, 
race and ethnicity, educational attainment, and work status. 𝛿𝛿𝑏𝑏 are time dummies. To 
allow the model to reflect any changes in labor market conditions for minorities, we 
interact linear trends, 𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏, with a female and a black dummy, 𝑋𝑋�𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖.  
We use the coefficient estimated from this regression to forecast the future labor 
earnings of the UAS sample, from their survey participation until their expected 
retirement. For purposes of prediction, the year dummy is held constant at 2015. To 
forecast future earnings growth, we follow the 2018 OASDI Trustees Report and 
assume a 1.17 percent annual real wage growth.13 
A.2.1 Earnings expectation bias 
We compare these forecasts to individual’s own expected future earnings. We 
compute the average annual earnings bias, defined as the average of the difference 
between the subjective expected earnings and our forecast in each future year. Figure 
A.2 shows the histogram of the distribution of earnings expectation bias in our sample of 
nonretirees.  
The average earnings expectation bias is $11,163, and this bias is positive 
across subgroups, as shown in Table A.1. According to Table A.1, the earnings 
expectation bias does not differ significantly by gender, but it does differ by education — 
                                               
13 From the Economic Assumptions Section in the 2018 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees 
of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Federal Disability Insurance Trust Funds: 
“OCACT expects the ultimate average annual rate of change in the average OASDI covered 
wage to be approximately the same as for (1) average U.S. wages and (2) average U.S. 
earnings (which include the self-employed). The average annual real growth rate in average 
U.S. earnings is assumed to be 1.17% over the 65-year period.” Accessed online at: 
https://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/2018/2018_Long-Range_Economic_Assumptions.pdf 
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with college workers showing a higher bias than those with lower educational attainment 
— and by marital status — married individuals have lower bias than individuals who are 
not married. 
Figure A.2: Distribution of earnings bias  
 
Note: Earnings expectation bias = Yforecsubj - YforecPSID.  
Table A.1: Average earnings expectation bias by subgroups 
 Expectation bias (=Yforecsubj - YforecPSID) 
95% Confidence 
interval 
Sample average 11,163.7 [9,066.3,13,261.0] 
Female 11,386.80 [8,878.6,13,895.1] 
Male 10,901.10 [7,418.5,14,383.7] 
Less than high 
school 
3,080.70 [-2,505.7,8,667.2] 
High school 7,956.20 [5,727.7,10,184.8] 
College 15,169.20 [11,396.1,18,942.4] 
Not married 13,722.50 [10,223.8,17,221.3] 
Married 9,918.20 [7,310.8,12,525.5] 
Note: Earnings bias is defined as the difference between expected annual earnings reported by 
respondents and earnings forecasts computed from PSID estimation. 
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A.3  Social Security retirement benefits calculation 
Using the sequence of past and predicted earnings, we follow these steps to 
forecast retirement benefits for the respondents in our survey: First, we adjust the 
earnings sequence to account for maximum taxable earnings. Social Security's Old-
Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance program limits the amount of earnings subject 
to taxation for a given year. The same annual limit applies when those earnings are 
used in a benefit computation.14 
Second, we index the sequence of earnings. The indexing factor equals one for 
the year in which the person attains age 60 and all later years. The indexing factor for a 
prior year x is the result of dividing the average wage index for the year in which the 
person attains age 60 by the national average wage index for year x.15 
Third, we compute the average indexed monthly earnings (AIME) using the 
highest 35 years of indexed earnings. The basic Social Security benefit is called the 
primary insurance amount (PIA). The PIA is a function of AIME. The formula for this 
function depends on the year of first eligibility for retirement (the year a person attains 
age 62) and it is based on PIA formula bend points published by the Social Security 
Administration.16 
Finally, the amount of retirement benefits a person will receive depends on their 
age when they begin claiming benefits. The benefits are adjusted depending on the 
person’s age relative to the full retirement age. Benefits are subject to a discount if 
                                               
14 This limit changes each year with changes in the national average wage index. The historical 
values of taxable maxima are available at: https://www.ssa.gov/OACT/COLA/cbb.html 
15 The National Average Wage Index Series is published by the Social Security Administration 
for every year since 1951. 
16 The Social Security website provides more information about the PIA formula: 
https://www.ssa.gov/oact/cola/piaformula.html  
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taken before a person's normal (or full) retirement age and are increased if taken after 
normal retirement age.17 Social Security also adjusts retirement benefits for inflation, 
which are cost-of-living adjustments.  
A.4  Model calibration 
We calibrate the model in a parsimonious way. We use standard parameter 
values when we can. These are the discount factor, 𝛽𝛽; the coefficient of relative risk 
aversion, 𝛾𝛾; and the annual interest rate, r. The top panel of Table A.2 shows these 
standard parameter values. We use our survey data to obtain the parameter values 
related to individuals’ expectations and forecasts of future earnings, shown in the 
bottom panel of Table A.2. We assume the same retirement age, R, for all individuals. 
This is also the age at which they start claiming retirement benefits. We set it equal to 
the current full retirement age. 
Table A.2: Parameters used in the numerical solution and simulations  
of the model 
Parameter Value 
Standard parameters 
𝜷𝜷 Discount factor 0.98 
𝜸𝜸 Coefficient of relative risk aversion 1.5 
r Annual interest rate 1% 
Calibrated/estimated parameters 
𝝆𝝆 Persistence of earnings process 0.957 
𝝈𝝈 Standard deviation of innovation to earnings 0.29 
R Claiming and retirement age 67 
𝝆𝝆𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺 Persistence of earnings process, subjective expectations 0.92 
𝝈𝝈𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺 Standard deviation of innovation to earnings, subjective expectations 0.37 
 
                                               
17 Details about these adjustments available at: 
https://www.ssa.gov/planners/retire/applying1.html 
